Não é pensando que criamos mundos. É compreendendo o mundo que aprendemos a pensar. Cosmovisão é um termo que deve significar um conjunto de fundamentos dos quais emerge uma compreensão sistêmica do Universo, seus componentes como a vida, o mundo em que vivemos, a natureza, o fenômeno humano e suas relações. Trata-se, portanto, de um campo da filosofia analítica alimentado pelas ciências, cujo objetivo é esse conhecimento agregado e epistemologicamente sustentável sobre tudo o que somos e contemos, que nos cerca (...) e que nos relaciona de alguma forma. É algo tão antigo quanto o pensamento humano e, além de utilizar elementos da cosmologia científica, engloba tudo na filosofia e na ciência que se refere ao universo e à vida. Uma cosmovisão não é um conjunto de ideias, hipóteses e suposições, mas um sistema baseado em observação, análise, evidência e demonstração. Nenhuma cosmovisão pretende definir, estabelecer, propor, mas apenas compreender, analisar e interpretar. Cada um de nós constrói e transporta sua cosmovisão ao longo da vida, sem estabelecer formas, como pano de fundo para nosso pensamento e comportamento. Linguisticamente, o termo “cosmovisão” derivaria do alemão, equivalente ao conceito de “ Weltanschauung”, usado por vários filósofos. No entanto, essa relação linguística não é aplicável porque contraria o que propomos como cosmovisão. Esta palavra alemã refere-se a uma visão pré-lógica ou proto-experimental da realidade, com um contexto intuitivo e longe de um conhecimento crítico ainda inexistente no momento da sua formulação. Sem dúvida, as cosmovisões , no sentido em que as entendemos, abrigam e utilizam esses elementos protoexperimentais ou pré-lógicos que incluem a história, o inconsciente coletivo e todos os arquétipos que carregamos. No entanto, no conceito que aqui aplicamos, a cosmovisão vai muito além desse conteúdo, primeiro por submetê-lo constantemente ao pensamento crítico presente e, finalmente, por tornar a experiência analítica (e não o próprio pensamento ou intuição) seu universo real. António Lopes expõe a amplitude deste conteúdo: -/- “Cosmovisões não são o produto do pensamento. Não nascem do simples desejo de saber. A apreensão da realidade é um momento importante em sua configuração, mas, no entanto, é apenas um. Vem da conduta vital, da experiência da vida, da estrutura de nossa totalidade psíquica. A elevação da vida à consciência no conhecimento da realidade, na valorização da vida e na realidade volitiva é o trabalho lento e árduo que a humanidade tem feito no desenvolvimento das concepções de vida. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)” Neste trabalho, buscamos traçar uma cosmovisão baseada nas realidades que a ciência oferece hoje. Não nos propomos, em nenhum momento, a fazer ciência ou teorizar a filosofia, mas sempre buscaremos ser apoiados por elas ou, pelo menos, protegidos por elas das distorções cognitivas que costumamos carregar. (shrink)

Ce n'est pas en pensant que nous créons des mondes. C'est en comprenant le monde que nous apprenons à penser. La cosmovision est un terme qui devrait désigner un ensemble de fondements d'où émerge une compréhension systémique de l'Univers, de ses composantes comme la vie, le monde dans lequel nous vivons, la nature, le phénomène humain et leurs relations. C'est donc un champ de la philosophie analytique nourri par les sciences, dont l'objectif est cette connaissance agrégée et épistémologiquement soutenable de (...) tout ce que nous sommes et contenons, qui nous entoure, et qui nous concerne de quelques manières que ce soit. C'est quelque chose d'aussi vieux que la pensée humaine et, en plus d'utiliser des éléments de la cosmologie scientifique, il englobe tout ce qui, dans la philosophie et la science, se réfère à l'univers et à la vie. Une cosmovision n'est pas un ensemble d'idées, d'hypothèses et de suppositions, mais un système établi sur l'observation, l'analyse, la preuve et la démonstration. Aucune cosmovision n'entend définir, établir ou proposer, mais seulement comprendre, analyser et interpréter. Chacun de nous construit et transporte sa cosmovision tout au long de sa vie, sans établir de forme, comme toile de fond de nos pensées et de nos comportements. Linguistiquement, le terme « cosmovision » dériverait de l'allemand, équivalent au concept de « Weltanschauung », tel qu'il a été utilisé par plusieurs philosophes. Cependant, cette relation linguistique n'est pas applicable, car elle contredit ce que nous proposons comme cosmovision. Ce mot allemand fait référence à une vision prélogique ou proto-expérimentale de la réalité, avec un contexte intuitif et loin des connaissances critiques encore inexistantes au moment de sa formulation. Sans aucun doute, les cosmovisions, au sens où nous les entendons, abritent et utilisent ces éléments proto-expérimentaux ou prélogiques qui incluent l'histoire, l'inconscient collectif et tous les archétypes que nous portons. Or, dans le concept que nous appliquons ici, la cosmovision va bien au-delà de ce contenu, d'abord en le soumettant constamment à la pensée critique actuelle et enfin en faisant de l'expérience analytique (et non de la pensée elle-même ou de l'intuition) son univers réel. António Lopes expose l'étendue de ce contenu : [ ] « Les cosmovisions ne sont pas le produit de la pensée. Ils ne naissent pas du simple désir de savoir. L'appréhension de la réalité est un moment important dans sa configuration, mais, néanmoins, ce n'en est qu'un. Elle vient de la conduite vitale, de l'expérience de la vie, de la structure de notre totalité psychique. L'élévation de la vie à la conscience dans la connaissance de la réalité, dans l'évaluation de la vie et dans la réalité volitive est le travail lent et ardu que l'humanité a fait dans le développement des conceptions de la vie. (W.Dilthey, 1992 [1911] : 120). Dans cet ouvrage, nous cherchons à esquisser une cosmovision fondée sur les réalités que la science offre aujourd'hui. Nous ne proposons, à aucun moment, de faire de la science ; ou théoriser la philosophie, mais nous chercherons toujours à être soutenus par eux ou, du moins, protégés par eux des distorsions cognitives que nous portons habituellement. -/- . (shrink)

It is not by thinking that we create worlds. It is by understanding the world that we learn to think. Cosmovision is a term that should mean a set of foundations from which emerges a systemic understanding of the Universe, its components as life, the world we live in, nature, human phenomena, and their relationships. It is, therefore, a field of analytical philosophy fed by the sciences, whose objective is this aggregated and epistemologically sustainable knowledge about everything that we are (...) and contain, that surrounds us, and that relates to us in any way. It is something as old as human thought, and, in addition to using elements of scientific cosmology, it encompasses everything in philosophy and science that refers to the universe and life. A cosmovision is not a set of ideas, hypotheses, and assumptions but a system based on observation, analysis, evidence, and demonstration. No cosmovision intends to define, establish, or propose but only to understand, analyse, and interpret. Each of us builds and transports his cosmovision throughout life, without establishing forms, as a background for our thinking and behaviour. Linguistically, the term “cosmovision” would derive from the German, equivalent to the concept of “ Weltanschauung,” as used by several philosophers. However, this linguistic relationship is not applicable because it contradicts what we propose as a cosmovision. This German word refers to a pre-logical or proto- experimental vision of reality, with an intuitive context and far from critical knowledge still non-existent at the time of its formulation. Undoubtedly, cosmovisions, in the sense in which we understand them, house and use these proto-experimental or pre-logical elements that include history, the collective unconscious, and all the archetypes we carry. However, in the concept that we apply here, the cosmovision goes far beyond this content, firstly by constantly submitting it to present critical thinking, and finally by making the analytic experience ( and not the thought itself or intuition) its actual universe. António Lopes expose the breadth of this content: -/- "Cosmovisions are not the product of thought. They do not spring from the simple desire to know. The apprehension of reality is an important moment in its configuration, but, nevertheless, it is only one. It comes from the vital conduct, from the experience of life's evaluation, and from the structure of our psychic totality. The elevation of life to consciousness in the knowledge of reality, in the valuation, and in the volitional reality is the slow and arduous work that humanity has done in the development of the conceptions of life. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)”(1) -/- In this work, we seek to outline a cosmovision based on the realities that science offers today. We do not propose, at any time, to do science; or theorise philosophy, but we will always seek to be supported by them or, at least, protected by them from the cognitive distortions that we usually carry. ________________________________________________ (1) Lopes , Antonio – “ Weltanschauung (Cosmovision)” (2009 ) in Carlos Ceia's E-Dictionary of Literary Terms. -/- . (shrink)

Kosmovisi Adalah Istilah yang seharusnya berarti seperangkat fondasi yang darinya muncul pemahaman sistemik tentang Alam Semesta, komponen-komponennya sebagai kehidupan, dunia tempat kita hidup, alam, fenomena manusia, dan hubungan mereka. Oleh karena itu, ini adalah bidang filsafat analitis yang disuplai oleh ilmu pengetahuan, yang tujuannya adalah pengetahuan yang terkumpul dan berkelanjutan secara epistemologis tentang segala sesuatu yang ada dan terkandung dalam diri kita, yang mengelilingi kita, dan yang berhubungan dengan kita dengan cara apa pun. Ini adalah sesuatu yang sama tuanya dengan (...) pemikiran manusia, dan, selain menggunakan unsur-unsur kosmologi ilmiah, ini mencakup segala sesuatu dalam filsafat dan sains yang mengacu pada alam semesta dan kehidupan. Kosmovisi bukanlah sekumpulan ide, hipotesis, dan asumsi, melainkan sebuah sistem yang didasarkan pada observasi, analisis, bukti, dan demonstrasi. Tidak ada kosmovisi yang bermaksud untuk mendefinisikan, menetapkan, atau mengusulkan, tetapi hanya memahami, menganalisis, dan menafsirkan. Masing-masing dari kita membangun dan membawa kosmovisi-nya sepanjang hidup, tanpa menetapkan bentuk, sebagai latar belakang pemikiran dan perilaku kita. Secara linguistic, Istilah "kosmovisi" akan berasal dari padanan bahasa Jerman untuk konsep "Weltanschauung", seperti yang digunakan oleh beberapa filsuf. Namun, hubungan linguistic ini tidak dapat diterapkan karena bertentangan dengan apa yang kami usulkan sebagai kosmovisi. Kata Jerman ini mengacu pada visi pra-logis atau proto-eksperimental tentang realitas, dengan konteks intuitif dan jauh dari pengetahuan kritis yang masih belum ada pada saat perumusannya. Tidak diragukan lagi, kosmovisi, dalam pengertian yang kita pahami, menampung dan menggunakan elemen-elemen proto-eksperimental atau pra-logis yang mencakup sejarah, ketidaksadaran kolektif, dan semua pola dasar yang kita bawa. Namun, dalam konsep yang kami terapkan di sini, kosmovisi jauh melampaui konten ini, pertama-tama dengan terus-menerus menyerahkannya untuk menghadirkan pemikiran kritis dan akhirnya dengan menjadikan pengalaman analitik (dan bukan pemikiran itu sendiri atau intuisi) sebagai alam semesta yang sebenarnya. António Lopes memaparkan luasnya konten ini: -/- "Kosmovisi bukanlah produk dari pemikiran. Mereka tidak muncul dari keinginan sederhana untuk mengetahui. Pemahaman tentang realitas adalah momen penting dalam konfigurasinya, tetapi, bagaimanapun, itu hanya satu. Itu berasal dari perilaku vital, dari pengalaman hidup, dari struktur totalitas psikis kita. Peningkatan kehidupan menuju kesadaran dalam pengetahuan tentang realitas, dalam penilaian kehidupan dan dalam realitas kehendak adalah pekerjaan yang lambat dan sulit yang telah dilakukan umat manusia dalam pengembangan konsepsi kehidupan. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)" . Dalam karya ini, kami berusaha menguraikan sebuah visi kosmik berdasarkan realitas yang ditawarkan sains saat ini. Kami tidak mengusulkan, kapan pun, untuk melakukan sains atau berteori tentang filsafat. Namun, kami akan selalu berusaha untuk didukung oleh mereka atau, setidaknya, dilindungi oleh mereka dari distorsi kognitif yang biasanya kita bawa. (shrink)

Ang Diyos ay hindi naglalaro ng dado", inulit ni Einstein mula sa taas ng kanyang determinismo, ngunit sa katunayan ang kosmos ay naghahagis ng mga buto nito nang sadyang mapagpasya: ang mga dado nito ay laruin. Hindi sa pag-iisip na tayo ay lumikha ng mga mundo. Sa pamamagitan ng pag-unawa sa mundo natututo tayong mag-isip. Ang Cosmovision ay isang termino na dapat ay nangangahulugang isang hanay ng mga pundasyon kung saan lumalabas ang isang sistematikong pag-unawa sa Uniberso, ang mga bahagi (...) nito bilang buhay, ang mundong ating ginagalawan, kalikasan, mga phenomena ng tao, at ang kanilang mga relasyon. Ito ay, samakatuwid, isang larangan ng analytical na pilosopiya na pinapakain ng mga agham, na ang layunin ay ang pinagsama-samang at epistemologically sustainable na kaalaman tungkol sa lahat ng kung ano tayo at nilalaman, na nakapaligid sa atin, at nauugnay sa atin sa anumang paraan. Ito ay isang bagay na kasingtanda ng pag-iisip ng tao, at, bilang karagdagan sa paggamit ng mga elemento ng siyentipikong kosmolohiya, sinasaklaw nito ang lahat ng bagay sa pilosopiya at agham na tumutukoy sa uniberso at buhay. Ang cosmovision ay hindi isang set ng mga ideya, hypotheses, at assumptions kundi isang sistemang batay sa obserbasyon, pagsusuri, ebidensya, at pagpapakita. Walang cosmovision na naglalayong tukuyin, itatag, o imungkahi ngunit para lamang maunawaan, suriin, at bigyang-kahulugan. Bawat isa sa atin ay nagtatayo at naghahatid ng kanyang kosmobisyon sa buong buhay, nang hindi nagtatatag ng mga anyo, bilang isang background para sa ating pag-iisip at pag-uugali. Sa lingguwistika, ang terminong "cosmovision" ay magmumula sa Aleman, katumbas ng konsepto ng "Weltanschauung," na ginamit ng ilang mga pilosopo. Gayunpaman, ang relasyong pangwika na ito ay hindi naaangkop dahil sumasalungat ito sa aming iminumungkahi bilang isang cosmovision. Ang salitang Aleman na ito ay tumutukoy sa isang pre-logical o proto- experimental na pananaw ng realidad, na may intuitive na konteksto at malayo sa kritikal na kaalaman na wala pa rin sa oras ng pagbabalangkas nito. Walang alinlangan, ang mga cosmovision, sa diwa kung saan natin nauunawaan ang mga ito, ay nagtataglay at gumagamit ng mga proto-experimental o pre-logical na elementong ito na kinabibilangan ng kasaysayan, ang sama-samang walang malay, at lahat ng mga archetype na dala natin. Gayunpaman, sa konseptong inilalapat natin dito, ang cosmovision ay higit na lumalampas sa nilalamang ito, una sa pamamagitan ng patuloy na pagsusumite nito upang ipakita ang kritikal na pag-iisip, at sa wakas sa pamamagitan ng paggawa ng analitikong karanasan (at hindi ang kaisipan mismo o intuwisyon) ang aktwal nitong uniberso. Inilantad ni António Lopes ang lawak ng nilalamang ito: "Ang mga cosmovision ay hindi produkto ng pag-iisip. Hindi sila nagmumula sa simpleng pagnanais na malaman. Ang pagkaunawa sa katotohanan ay isang mahalagang sandali sa pagsasaayos nito, ngunit, gayunpaman, ito ay isa lamang. Ito ay nagmumula sa mahahalagang pag-uugali, mula sa karanasan ng pagsusuri sa buhay, at mula sa istruktura ng ating saykiko na kabuuan Ang pagtaas ng buhay sa kamalayan sa kaalaman sa realidad, sa pagpapahalaga, at sa kusang katotohanan ay ang mabagal at mahirap na gawain. na ginawa ng sangkatauhan sa pagbuo ng mga konsepto ng buhay (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120). Sa gawaing ito, hinahangad nating balangkasin ang isang kosmobisyon batay sa mga realidad na inaalok natin ngayon hindi nagmumungkahi, sa anumang oras, na gumawa ng agham; o magteorya ng pilosopiya, ngunit lagi nating hahanapin na suportahan sila o, hindi bababa sa, protektahan nila mula sa mga pang-unawang distorsyon na karaniwan nating dala. (shrink)

In the introduction to the volume, the editors explain the overarching aim of the volume and contextualize the main themes of its chapters. Even if the notions of biopolitics and biopower have played a crucial role in philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences over the last decades, they have been used in various and at times diverging senses, which has also produced different narratives about the history of biopolitics. The main aim of the volume is to clarify whether and (...) to what extent the concept of biopolitics is applicable to antiquity. To answer such questions, the chapters collected in the volume address three main topics, namely the possible presence of biopolitical discourse in ancient thought, the extent to which the application of a biopolitical approach to ancient thought requires qualifications, and some influential contemporary interpretations of the relation between biopolitics and antiquity. (shrink)

No es pensando como creamos mundos. Es comprendiendo el mundo como aprendemos a pensar. Cosmovisión es un término que debe significar un conjunto de fundamentos a partir de los cuales emerge una comprensión sistémica del Universo, sus componentes como la vida, el mundo en que vivimos, la naturaleza, el fenómeno humano y sus relaciones. Es, por tanto, un campo de la filosofía analítica alimentado por las ciencias, cuyo objetivo es ese conocimiento agregado y epistemológicamente sostenible sobre todo lo que somos (...) y contenemos, que nos rodea y con lo que nos relacionamos de alguna manera. Es algo tan antiguo como el pensamiento humano y, además de utilizar elementos de la cosmología científica, engloba todo lo que en filosofía y ciencia se refiere al universo y la vida. Una cosmovisión no es un conjunto de ideas, hipótesis y suposiciones, sino un sistema basado en la observación, el análisis, la evidencia y la demostración. Ninguna cosmovisión pretende definir, establecer, proponer, sino solo comprender, analizar e interpretar. Cada uno de nosotros construimos y transportamos nuestra cosmovisión a lo largo de nuestra vida, sin establecer formas, como trasfondo de nuestro pensamiento y comportamiento. Lingüísticamente, el término “cosmovisión” se deriva del alemán, equivalente al concepto de “Weltanschauung” utilizado por varios filósofos. Sin embargo, esta relación lingüística no es aplicable porque va en contra de lo que proponemos como cosmovisión. Esta palabra alemana hace referencia a una visión prelógica o protoexperimental de la realidad, con un contexto intuitivo y alejado de un conocimiento crítico que aún no existía en el momento de su formulación. Sin duda, las cosmovisiones, no tiene sentido en que las entendamos, cobijen y utilicen estos elementos proto-experimentales o prelógicos que incluyen la historia, el inconsciente colectivo y todos los arquetipos que portamos. Sin embargo, en el concepto que aquí aplicamos, la cosmovisión va mucho más allá de este contenido, primero al someterlo constantemente al pensamiento crítico actual y, finalmente, al hacer de la experiencia analítica (y no del pensamiento o la intuición en sí) su verdadero universo. António Lopes expone la amplitud de este contenido: -/- “Las cosmovisiones no son el producto del pensamiento. No nacen del simple deseo de saber. La aprehensión de la realidad es un momento importante en su configuración, sin embargo, es uno solo. Proviene de la conducta vital, de la experiencia de vida, de la estructura de nuestra totalidad psíquica. El apoyo de la vida a la conciencia en el conocimiento de la realidad, en la apreciación de la vida y en la realidad volitiva, es el trabajo lento y arduo que ha hecho la humanidad en el desarrollo de los conceptos de vida. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)” . En este trabajo buscamos esbozar una cosmovisión a partir de las realidades que ofrece la ciencia en la actualidad. No nos proponemos, en ningún momento, hacer ciencia; o teorizar la filosofía, pero siempre buscaremos ser apoyados por ellos o, al menos, protegidos por ellos de las distorsiones cognitivas que solemos llevar. -/- . (shrink)

Beneficios e incentivos económicos tributarios en materia ambiental para el desarrollo sostenible de terminales marítimos de contenedores y carga general en Colombia.

Reasons-first theorists claim that facts about reasons for attitudes are normatively primitive, and that all other normative facts ultimately reduce to facts about reasons. According to their view, for example, the fact that something is good ultimately reduces to facts about reasons to favour it. I argue that these theories face a challenging dilemma due to the normativity of arational lifeforms, for instance the fact that water is good for plants. If all normative facts are, ultimately, facts about reasons for (...) attitudes, then reasons-first theorists must either (a) show that these facts do reduce to facts about reasons, or (b) concede that they do not and, instead, show that this is not a problem for their view. Both options, however, are riddled with difficulties—or so I will try to argue. (shrink)

This paper presents a semantical analysis of the Weak Kleene Logics Kw3 and PWK from the tradition of Bochvar and Halldén. These are three-valued logics in which a formula takes the third value if at least one of its components does. The paper establishes two main results: a characterisation result for the relation of logical con- sequence in PWK – that is, we individuate necessary and sufficient conditions for a set.

A wide family of many-valued logics—for instance, those based on the weak Kleene algebra—includes a non-classical truth-value that is ‘contaminating’ in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula φ⁠, any complex formula in which φ appears is assigned that value as well. In such systems, the contaminating value enjoys a wide range of interpretations, suggesting scenarios in which more than one of these interpretations are called for. This calls for an evaluation of systems with multiple contaminating (...) values. In this paper, we consider the countably infinite family of multiple-conclusion consequence relations in which classical logic is enriched with one or more contaminating values whose behavior is determined by a linear ordering between them. We consider some motivations and applications for such systems and provide general characterizations for all consequence relations in this family. Finally, we provide sequent calculi for a pair of four-valued logics including two linearly ordered contaminating values before defining two-sided sequent calculi corresponding to each of the infinite family of many-valued logics studied in this paper. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with certain ontological issues in the foundations of geographic representation. It sets out what these basic issues are, describes the tools needed to deal with them, and draws some implications for a general theory of spatial representation. Our approach has ramifications in the domains of mereology, topology, and the theory of location, and the question of the interaction of these three domains within a unified spatial representation theory is addressed. In the final part we also consider (...) the idea of non-standard geographies, which may be associated with geography under a classical conception in the same sense in which non-standard logics are associated with classical logic. (shrink)

Nicht durch das Denken erschaffen wir Welten. Indem wir die Welt verstehen, lernen wir zu denken. Kosmovision ist ein Begriff, der eine Reihe von Grundlagen bedeuten sollte, aus denen ein systemisches Verständnis des Universums, seiner Bestandteile als Leben, der Welt, in der wir leben, der Natur, des menschlichen Phänomens und ihrer Beziehungen hervorgehen sollte. Es handelt sich also um ein von den Wissenschaften gespeistes Feld der analytischen Philosophie, deren Ziel dieses aggregierte und erkenntnistheoretisch nachhaltige Wissen über alles ist, was wir (...) sind und beinhalten, was uns umgibt und was uns in einer Weise betrifft. Sie ist so alt wie das menschliche Denken und umfasst neben der Verwendung von Elementen der wissenschaftlichen Kosmologie alles in Philosophie und Wissenschaft, was sich auf das Universum und das Leben bezieht. Eine Kosmovision ist keine Sammlung von Ideen, Hypothesen und Annahmen, sondern ein System, das auf Beobachtung, Analyse, Beweisen und Demonstrationen basiert. Keine Kosmovision will definieren, etablieren oder vorschlagen, sondern nur verstehen, analysieren und interpretieren. Jeder von uns baut und transportiert sein ganzes Leben lang seine Kosmovision, ohne Formen zu etablieren, als Hintergrund für unser Denken und Handeln. In dieser Arbeit versuchen wir, eine Kosmovision zu skizzieren, die auf den Realitäten basiert, die die Wissenschaft heute bietet. Wir schlagen zu keinem Zeitpunkt vor, Wissenschaft zu betreiben; oder Philosophie zu theoretisieren, aber wir werden immer versuchen, von ihnen unterstützt oder zumindest vor den kognitiven Verzerrungen geschützt zu werden, die wir normalerweise mit uns herumtragen. (shrink)

Космовидение - термин, под которым следует понимать совокупность оснований, из которых возникает системное понимание Вселенной, таких ее составляющих, как жизнь, мир, в котором мы живем, природа, феномен человека, и их взаимосвязей. таким образом, это область аналитической философии, питаемая науками, целью которой является совокупное и эпистемологически устойчивое знание обо всем, чем мы являемся и что в нас содержится, что нас окружает и что так или иначе с нами связано. это старое, как человеческая мысль, понятие, которое не только использует элементы научной космологии, (...) но и охватывает все, что относится к вселенной и жизни в философии и науке. Космовидение — это не набор идей, гипотез и предположений, а система, основанная на наблюдениях, анализе, доказательствах и демонстрациях. Космовидение не ставит своей целью определить, установить или предложить, а лишь понять, проанализировать и интерпретировать. Каждый из нас строит и переносит свое космовидение в течение жизни, не устанавливая форм, как фон для нашего мышления и поведения. С лингвистической точки зрения термин "космовидение" происходит от немецкого, эквивалентного понятию "Weltanschauung", используемому рядом философов. Однако эта лингвистическая связь неприменима, поскольку противоречит тому, что мы предлагаем в качестве космовидения. Это немецкое слово обозначает дологическое или протоэкспериментальное видение реальности, имеющее интуитивный контекст и далекое от критического знания, еще не существовавшего на момент его формулировки. Несомненно, космовидения в том смысле, как мы их понимаем, содержат и используют эти протоэкспериментальные или дологические элементы, включающие историю, коллективное бессознательное и все архетипы, которые мы носим в себе. Однако в той концепции, которую мы здесь применяем, космовидение выходит далеко за пределы этого содержания, во-первых, постоянно подчиняя его современному критическому мышлению и, наконец, делая аналитический опыт (а не саму мысль или интуицию) своей актуальной вселенной. Антониу Лопес раскрывает широту этого содержания: -/- "Космовидения не являются продуктом мысли. Они не возникают из простого желания знать. Постижение реальности - важный момент в ее конфигурации, но, тем не менее, только один. Оно исходит из жизненного поведения, из жизненного опыта, из структуры нашей психической совокупности. Возвышение жизни до сознания в познании реальности, в оценке жизни и в волевой реальности — это медленная и тяжелая работа, которую проделало человечество в развитии представлений о жизни". (В. Дильтей, 1992 [1911]: 120)". . В данной работе мы стремимся изложить космовидение, основанное на тех реалиях, которые сегодня предлагает наука. Мы ни в коем случае не собираемся заниматься наукой или теоретизировать философию, но всегда будем стремиться опираться на них или, по крайней мере, защищаться ими от тех когнитивных искажений, которые мы обычно несем. (shrink)

This paper discusses three relevant logics that obey Component Homogeneity - a principle that Goddard and Routley introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper establishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity - that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Second, the paper establishes complete sequent calculi (...) for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Among the other accomplishments of the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallden, Deutsch and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion fragment of S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fdeand the connections between crossS*fde and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S*fde as a relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss Routley's criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and overview some open issues. (shrink)

Book Description (Blurb): Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds explains the crucial role that human cognition research plays in the design and realization of artificial intelligence systems, illustrating the steps necessary for the design of artificial models of cognition. It bridges the gap between the theoretical, experimental and technological issues addressed in the context of AI of cognitive inspiration and computational cognitive science. -/- Beginning with an overview of the historical, methodological and technical issues in the field of Cognitively-Inspired Artificial Intelligence, (...) Lieto illustrates how the cognitive design approach has an important role to play in the development of intelligent AI technologies and plausible computational models of cognition. Introducing a unique perspective that draws upon Cybernetics and early AI principles, Lieto emphasizes the need for an equivalence between cognitive processes and implemented AI procedures, in order to realise biologically and cognitively inspired artificial minds. He also introduces the Minimal Cognitive Grid, a pragmatic method to rank the different degrees of biologically and cognitive accuracy of artificial systems in order project and predict their explanatory power with respect to the natural systems taken as source of inspiration. -/- Providing a comprehensive overview of cognitive design principles in constructing artificial minds, this text will be essential reading for students and researchers of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper I will present three arguments (based on the notions of constitution, metaphysical reality, and truth, respectively) with the aim of shedding some new light on the structure of Fine’s (2005, 2006) ‘McTaggartian’ arguments against the reality of tense. Along the way, I will also (i) draw a novel map of the main realist positions about tense, (ii) unearth a previously unnoticed but potentially interesting form of external relativism (which I will label ‘hyper-presentism’) and (iii) sketch a novel (...) interpretation of Fine’s fragmentalism (which I contrast with Lipman’s 2015, 2016b, forthcoming). (shrink)

There are two main ways in which the notion of mereological fusion is usually defined in the current literature in mereology which have been labelled ‘Leśniewski fusion’ and ‘Goodman fusion’. It is well-known that, with Minimal Mereology as the background theory, every Leśniewski fusion also qualifies as a Goodman fusion. However, the converse does not hold unless stronger mereological principles are assumed. In this paper I will discuss how the gap between the two notions can be filled, focussing in particular (...) on two specific sets of principles that appear to be of particular philosophical interest. The first way to make the two notions equivalent can be used to shed some interesting light on the kind of intuition both notions seem to articulate. The second shows the importance of a little-known mereological principle which I will call ‘Mild Supplementation’. As I will show, the mereology obtained by adding Mild Supplementation to Minimal Mereology occupies an interesting position in the landscape of theories that are stronger than Minimal Mereology but weaker than what Achille Varzi and Roberto Casati have labelled ‘Extensional Mereology’. (shrink)

Grounding contingentism is the doctrine according to which grounds are not guaranteed to necessitate what they ground. In this paper I will argue that the most plausible version of contingentism is incompatible with the idea that the grounding relation is transitive, unless either ‘priority monism’ or ‘contrastivism’ are assumed.

According to Composition is Identity, a whole is literally identical to the plurality of its parts. According to Mereological Nihilism, nothing has proper parts. In this note, it is argued that Composition is Identity can be shown to entail Mereological Nihilism in a much more simple and direct way than the one recently proposed by Claudio Calosi.

What is the relation between parts taken together and the whole that they compose? The recent literature appears to be dominated by two different answers to this question, which are normally thought of as being incompatible. According to the first, parts taken together are identical to the whole that they compose. According to the second, the whole is grounded in its parts. The aim of this paper is to make some theoretical room for the view according to which parts ground (...) the whole they compose while being, at the same time, identical to it. (shrink)

In this paper we identify and characterize an analysis of two problematic aspects affecting the representational level of cognitive architectures (CAs), namely: the limited size and the homogeneous typology of the encoded and processed knowledge. We argue that such aspects may constitute not only a technological problem that, in our opinion, should be addressed in order to build arti cial agents able to exhibit intelligent behaviours in general scenarios, but also an epistemological one, since they limit the plausibility of the (...) comparison of the CAs' knowledge representation and processing mechanisms with those executed by humans in their everyday activities. In the fi nal part of the paper further directions of research will be explored, trying to address current limitations and future challenges. (shrink)

In actuarial parlance, the price of an insurance policy is considered fair if customers bearing the same risk are charged the same price. The estimate of this fair amount hinges on the expected value obtained by weighting the different claims by their probability. We argue that, historically, this concept of actuarial fairness originates in an Aristotelian principle of justice in exchange (equality in risk). We will examine how this principle was formalized in the 16th century and shaped in life insurance (...) during the following two hundred years, in two different interpretations. The Domatian account of actuarial fairness relied on subjective uncertainty: An agreement on risk was fair if both parties were equally ignorant about the chances of an uncertain event. The objectivist version grounded any agreement on an objective risk estimate drawn from a mortality table. We will show how the objectivist approach collapsed in the market for life annuities during the 18th century, leaving open the question of why we still speak of actuarial fairness as if it were an objective expected value. (shrink)

Fine (2005, 2006) has presented a ‘trilemma’ concerning the tense-realist idea that reality is constituted by tensed facts. According to Fine, there are only three ways out of the trilemma, consisting in what he takes to be the three main families of tense-realism: ‘presentism’, ‘(external) relativism’, and ‘fragmentalism’. Importantly, although Fine characterises tense-realism as the thesis that reality is constituted (at least in part) by tensed facts, he explicitly claims that tense realists are not committed to their fundamental existence. Recently, (...) Correia and Rosenkranz (2011, 2012) have claimed that Fine’s tripartite map of tense realism is incomplete as it misses a fourth position they call ‘dynamic absolutism’. In this paper, I will argue that dynamic absolutists are committed to the irreducible existence of tensed facts and that, for this reason, they face a similar trilemma concerning the notion of fact-content. I will thus conclude that a generalised version of Fine’s trilemma, concerning both fact-constitution and fact-content, is indeed inescapable. (shrink)

n the philosophy of language, there are many ongoing controversies that stem from relying too heavily on an utterance-based framework. The traditional approach of rigidly partitioning the utterance’s meaning into what is grammatically determined from what is not may not fully capture the complexity of human language in real-world communicative contexts. To address this issue, we suggest shifting focus toward a broader analysis level encompassing conversations and discourses. From this broader perspective, it is possible to obtain a more integrated view (...) of how linguistic and extra-linguistic aspects dynamically interact and thus reconsider semantics/pragmatics dichotomy as complementary dimensions. Meaning is not confined to linguistic structures alone but emerges from the dynamic interplay of words, sociocultural knowledge, discursive situations, and psychological dispositions of speakers. Substantiating this perspective calls for embracing an interdisciplinary approach that synthesizes research from various domains, including linguistics, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of language. This paper focuses on a particularly compelling case study: aphasia. Speeches produced by individuals with aphasia represent complex scenarios where the balance between linguistic and extra-linguistic aspects is notably compromised, often to the former’s detriment. Aphasics’ productions represent a vivid example of how the interpretation of speeches can be far from involving fixed and static operations. Instead, it entails continuously reallocating cognitive resources toward the most readily available and accessible sources for the speakers. This case study ultimately demonstrates that the influence of semantic and pragmatic processes in shaping and conveying meanings displays remarkable adaptability, continuously adjusting to the ever changing demands placed upon speakers. -/- . (shrink)

We defend, from a contractarian perspective, that the fair price of an insurance policy is the amount that the contracting parties agree when they are both equally uncertain about the insured event. Drawing on the approach developed by R. Sugden in _The Community of Advantage_, we answer two standard objections raised against contractarianism in the actuarial sciences: (1) people are not wise enough to assess their actuarial risks; (2) they are not rational enough to decide which insurance policy suits them (...) better. We show under which circumstances people can make fair actuarial agreements, without presupposing any objective risk or rationality benchmarks. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe ability of providing an adequate supervenience base for tensed truths may seem to be one of the main theoretical advantages of both the growing-block and the moving-spotlight theory of time over presentism. However, in this paper I will argue that some propositions appear to be as problematic for growing-block theorists as past-directed propositions are for presentists, namely propositions stating that nothing will be the case in the future. Furthermore, I will show that the moving-spotlight theory can adequately address all (...) the main supervenience challenges that can be levelled against A-theories of time. I will, thus, conclude that, at least as far as the supervenience principle is concerned, the moving-spotlight theory should be preferred over both presentism and the growing-block theory. (shrink)

The possibility of changing the past by means of time-travel appears to depend on the possibility of distinguishing the past as it is ‘before’ and ‘after’ the time-travel. So far, all the metaphysical models that have been proposed to account for the possibility of past-changing time-travels operate this distinction by conceiving of time as multi-dimensional, and thus by significantly inflating our metaphysics of time. The aim of this article is to argue that there is an intuitive sense in which past-changing (...) time-travels are metaphysically possible also in one-dimensional time. (shrink)

In this paper I address two important objections to the theory called ‘ Composition as Identity’ : the ‘wall-bricks-and-atoms problem’, and the claim that CAI entails mereological nihilism. I aim to argue that the best version of CAI capable of addressing both problems is the theory I will call ‘Atomic Composition as Identity’ which consists in taking the plural quantifier to range only over proper pluralities of mereological atoms and every non-atomic entity to be identical to the plurality of atoms (...) it fuses. I will proceed in three main steps. First, I will defend Sider’s Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 211–221, 2014) idea of weakening the comprehension principle for pluralities and I will show that :219–235, 2016a) it can ward off both the WaBrA problem and the threat of mereological nihilism. Second, I will argue that CAI-theorists should uphold an ‘atomic comprehension principle’ which, jointly with CAI, entails that there are only proper pluralities of mereological atoms. Finally, I will present a novel reading of the ‘one of’ relation that not only avoids the problems presented by Yi Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 169–191, 2014) and Calosi :429–443, 2016b, Am Philos Q 55:281–292, 2018) but can also help ACAI-theorists to make sense of the idea that a composite entity is both one and many. (shrink)

The book is divided into three parts. The first, containing three papers, focuses on the characterization of the central tenets of previii sentism (by Neil McKinnon) and eternalism (by Samuel Baron and Kristie Miller), and on the ‘sceptical stance’ (by Ulrich Meyer), a view to the effect that there is no substantial difference between presentism and eternalism. The second and main section of the book contains three pairs of papers that bring the main problems with presentism to the fore and (...) outlines its defence strategy. Each pair of papers in this section can be read as a discussion between presentists and eternalists, wherein each directly responds to the arguments and objections offered by the other. This is a discussion that is sometimes absent in the literature, or which is at best carried out in a fragmented way. The first two papers of the section deal with the problem of the compatibility of Special Relativity Theory (SRT) and presentism. SRT is often considered to be a theory that contradicts the main tenet of presentism, thereby rendering presentism at odds with one of our most solid scientific theories. Christian Wüthrich’s paper presents arguments for the incompatibility of the two theories (SRT and presentism) within a new framework that includes a discussion of further complications arising from the theory of Qauantum Mechanics. Jonathan Lowe’s paper, by contrast, develops new general arguments against the incompatibility thesis and replies to Wüthrich’s paper. The second pair of papers focuses on the problem that presentists face, in providing grounds for past tensed truths. In the first (by Matthew Davidson), new arguments are provided to defend the idea that the presentist cannot adequately explain how what is now true about the past is grounded, since for the presentist the past is completely devoid of ontological ground. The second paper (by Brian Kierland) takes up the challenge of developing a presentist explanation of past truths, beginning by outlining some existing views in the literature before advancing an original proposal. (shrink)

Logics based on weak Kleene algebra (WKA) and related structures have been recently proposed as a tool for reasoning about flaws in computer programs. The key element of this proposal is the presence, in WKA and related structures, of a non-classical truth-value that is “contaminating” in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula ϕ, any complex formula in which ϕ appears is assigned that value as well. Under such interpretations, the contaminating states represent occurrences of a (...) flaw. However, since different programs and machines can interact with (or be nested into) one another, we need to account for different kind of errors, and this calls for an evaluation of systems with multiple contaminating values. In this paper, we make steps toward these evaluation systems by considering two logics, HYB1 and HYB2, whose semantic interpretations account for two contaminating values beside classical values 0 and 1. In particular, we provide two main formal contributions. First, we give a characterization of their relations of (multiple-conclusion) logical consequence—that is, necessary and sufficient conditions for a set Δ of formulas to logically follow from a set Γ of formulas in HYB1 or HYB2 . Second, we provide sound and complete sequent calculi for the two logics. (shrink)

In this article we present an advanced version of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-inspired knowledge representation and reasoning system aimed at extending the capabilities of artificial systems in conceptual categorization tasks. It combines different sorts of common-sense categorization (prototypical and exemplars-based categorization) with standard monotonic categorization procedures. These different types of inferential procedures are reconciled according to the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reasoning. On the other hand, from a representational perspective, the system relies on the hypothesis of conceptual (...) structures represented as heterogeneous proxytypes. Dual-PECCS has been experimentally assessed in a task of conceptual categorization where a target concept illustrated by a simple common-sense linguistic description had to be identified by resorting to a mix of categorization strategies, and its output has been compared to human responses. The obtained results suggest that our approach can be beneficial to improve the representational and reasoning conceptual capabilities of standard cognitive artificial systems, and –in addition– that it may be plausibly applied to different general computational models of cognition. The current version of the system, in fact, extends our previous work, in that Dual-PECCS is now integrated and tested into two cognitive architectures, ACT-R and CLARION, implementing different assumptions on the underlying invariant structures governing human cognition. Such integration allowed us to extend our previous evaluation. (shrink)

I present a ‘stage-theoretical’ interpretation of the supervaluationist semantics for the growing-block theory of time according to which the ‘nodes’ on the branching tree of historical possibilities are taken to be possible stages of the growth of the growing-block. As I will argue, the resulting interpretation (i) is very intuitive, (ii) can easily ward off an objection to supervaluationist treatments of the growing-block theory presented by Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz, and (iii) is also not saddled by the problems affecting (...) the supervaluationist version of the growing-block theory defended by R. A. Briggs and Graeme A. Forbes. (shrink)

We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phenomenon of the combination of prototypical concepts. The proposed logic relies on the logic of typicality ALC + TR, whose semantics is based on the notion of rational closure, as well as on the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics, and is equipped with a cognitive heuristic used by humans for concept composition. We first extend the logic of typicality ALC + TR by typicality inclusions of the (...) form p :: T(C) v D, whose intuitive meaning is that “we believe with degree p about the fact that typical Cs are Ds”. As in the distributed semantics, we define different scenarios containing only some typicality inclusions, each one having a suitable probability. We then exploit such scenarios in order to ascribe typical properties to a concept C obtained as the combination of two prototypical concepts. We also show that reasoning in the proposed Description Logic is EXPTIME-complete as for the underlying standard Description Logic ALC. (shrink)

Most of the theories of location on the market appear to be ideologically parsimonious at least in the sense that they take as primitive just one locative notion and define all the other locative notions in terms of it. Recently, however, the possibility of some exotic metaphysical scenarios involving gunky mixtures and extended simple regions of space has been argued to pose a significant threat to parsimonious theories of locations. The aim of this paper is to show that a theory (...) taking as primitive a notion of plural pervasive location and allowing for irreducibly plural locative facts can account for all the putatively problematic scenarios for parsimonious theories of location. Furthermore, I will also argue that the notion of plural pervasive location is compatible with the possibility of multilocation. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to address the “Grounding Grounding Problem,” that is, the question as to what, if anything, grounds facts about grounding. I aim to show that, if a seemingly plausible principle of modal recombination between fundamental facts and the principle customarily called “Entailment” are assumed, it is possible to prove not only that grounding facts featuring fundamental, contingent grounds are derivative but also that either they are partially grounded in the grounds they feature or they are (...) “abysses”. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a computational framework aimed at extending the problem solving capabilities of cognitive artificial agents through the introduction of a novel, goal-directed, dynamic knowledge generation mechanism obtained via a non monotonic reasoning procedure. In particular, the proposed framework relies on the assumption that certain classes of problems cannot be solved by simply learning or injecting new external knowledge in the declarative memory of a cognitive artificial agent but, on the other hand, require a mechanism for the (...) automatic and creative re-framing, or re-formulation, of the available knowledge. We show how such mechanism can be obtained trough a framework of dynamic knowledge generation that is able to tackle the problem of commonsense concept combination. In addition, we show how such a framework can be employed in the field of cognitive architectures in order to overcome situations like the impasse in SOAR by extending the possible options of its subgoaling procedures. (shrink)

According to ‘Strong Composition as Identity’, if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAI-theorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some ‘weak’ plural comprehension principle and, thus, ‘exclude’ some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what (...) may appear at first sight, the assumption of a weak plural comprehension principle is perfectly compatible with plural logic and the common uses of plural quantification. As I aim to show, SCAI-theorists can simply claim that their theory must be understood as formulated by means of the most ‘joint-carving’ plural quantifier, thus leaving open the possibility of other, less joint-carving, ‘unrestricted’ plural quantifiers. In the final part of the paper I will also suggest that SCAI-theorists should not only allow for singular quantification over pluralities of entities, but also for plural quantification over ‘super-pluralities’ of entities. (shrink)

We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phenomenon of combining prototypical concepts, an open problem in the fields of AI and cognitive modelling. Our logic extends the logic of typicality ALC + TR, based on the notion of rational closure, by inclusions p :: T(C) v D (“we have probability p that typical Cs are Ds”), coming from the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics. Additionally, it embeds a set of cognitive heuristics for concept (...) combination. We show that the complexity of reasoning in our logic is EXPTIME-complete as in ALC. (shrink)

During the last decades, many cognitive architectures (CAs) have been realized adopting different assumptions about the organization and the representation of their knowledge level. Some of them (e.g. SOAR [35]) adopt a classical symbolic approach, some (e.g. LEABRA[ 48]) are based on a purely connectionist model, while others (e.g. CLARION [59]) adopt a hybrid approach combining connectionist and symbolic representational levels. Additionally, some attempts (e.g. biSOAR) trying to extend the representational capacities of CAs by integrating diagrammatical representations and reasoning are (...) also available [34]. In this paper we propose a reflection on the role that Conceptual Spaces, a framework developed by Peter G¨ardenfors [24] more than fifteen years ago, can play in the current development of the Knowledge Level in Cognitive Systems and Architectures. In particular, we claim that Conceptual Spaces offer a lingua franca that allows to unify and generalize many aspects of the symbolic, sub-symbolic and diagrammatic approaches (by overcoming some of their typical problems) and to integrate them on a common ground. In doing so we extend and detail some of the arguments explored by G¨ardenfors [23] for defending the need of a conceptual, intermediate, representation level between the symbolic and the sub-symbolic one. In particular we focus on the advantages offered by Conceptual Spaces (w.r.t. symbolic and sub-symbolic approaches) in dealing with the problem of compositionality of representations based on typicality traits. Additionally, we argue that Conceptual Spaces could offer a unifying framework for interpreting many kinds of diagrammatic and analogical representations. As a consequence, their adoption could also favor the integration of diagrammatical representation and reasoning in CAs. (shrink)

In its simplest form, a Spritz is an aperitif made with (sparkling) water and (white) wine. A ‘gunky Spritz’, as I will call it, is a Spritz in which the water and the wine are mixed through and through, so that every proper part of the Spritz has a proper part containing both water and wine. In the literature on the notion of location the possibility of mixtures like a gunky Spritz has been thought of as either threatening seemingly intuitive (...) locative principles, or as requiring the position of multiple primitive locative relations. In this paper I present a new theory of location which assumes as primitive only the notion of pervasive location and show that it can account for the possibility of gunky Spritz in an intuitive and adequate way. (shrink)

It has become common, following Stephen Darwall’s “Two Kinds of Respect”, to distinguish between “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect.” I propose, rather, to distinguish between hierarchical and egalitarian respect. The way the two meanings interact and the way they either support or contrast with each other have yet to be made clear. The meanings gathered under the broad rubric of respect can be highlighted by a genealogy that convincingly shows that the hierarchical notion is fundamental and that the definition of (...) an egalitarian meaning is a decisive shift made mainly by the Enlightenment movement, particularly by Kant. Furthermore, the notion of respect is currently being extended beyond persons—to animals, other living beings, and the environment. I argue that we can justifiably do so on the basis of the interaction between the hierarchical and egalitarian notions of respect. (shrink)

This capstone is centered around the development of an efficient electronic property inventory system tailored for school assets, driven by the overarching objective of resource optimization to ensure equitable access to vital materials for all learners. The methodology follows the “ISSO” framework (Ignite, Strategize, Systematize, Operationalize), complemented by a Logical Framework. The project employs a homegrown digitalized system constructed through a waterfall model approach, which undergoes alpha and beta testing. The study’s analysis utilizes a t-Test to evaluate its impact. The (...) outcomes reveal that real-time property monitoring significantly enhances custodianship, while digitalization yields improvements in reliability, efficiency, and usability, effectively overhauling the conventional inventory process. The electronic system fosters stakeholder engagement, supporting communication, budget allocation, and audits. Comparative testing demonstrates clear advantages over traditional manual methods. In conclusion, this study underscores the merits of a refined electronic property inventory system. Notably, the research suggests a need for careful consideration of process complexities in outsourcing decisions and showcases the swift, precise, and transparent accounting provided by e-AIMSS deployments, thereby nurturing transparency and public confidence. This innovative approach holds promise for broader application within the realm of e-government processes. (shrink)

In this paper, we extend the expressive power of the logics K3, LP and FDE with anormality operator, which is able to express whether a for-mula is assigned a classical truth value or not. We then establish classical recapture theorems for the resulting logics. Finally, we compare the approach via normality operator with the classical collapse approach devisedby Jc Beall.

In this paper a possible general framework for the representation of concepts in cognitive artificial systems and cognitive architectures is proposed. The framework is inspired by the so called proxytype theory of concepts and combines it with the heterogeneity approach to concept representations, according to which concepts do not constitute a unitary phenomenon. The contribution of the paper is twofold: on one hand, it aims at providing a novel theoretical hypothesis for the debate about concepts in cognitive sciences by providing (...) unexplored connections between different theories; on the other hand it is aimed at sketching a computational characterization of the problem of concept representation in cognitively inspired artificial systems and in cognitive architectures. (shrink)

My aim is to defend a peculiar epistemic version of the particularity thesis, which results from a sui generis combination of what I call the ‘singular relational view’ and what I call the ‘relativistic content view.’ Particulars are not represented as part of putative singular content. Instead, we are perceptually acquainted with them in the relevant sense that experience puts us in direct perceptual contact with them. And the content of experience is best modeled as a propositional function, that is, (...) the content of a complex predicate that is true or false only relative to some circumstances of evaluation. (shrink)

Constituent power : the concept of a crisis -- Virtue and fortune : the machiavellian paradigm -- The Atlantic model and the theory of counterpower -- Political emancipation in the American constitution -- The revolution and the constitution of labor -- Communist desire and the dialectic restored -- The constitution of strength.

Il Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium, composto da Guglielmo di Ockham tra il 1321 e il 1324, costituisce uno snodo cruciale nelle discussioni medievali sul tema del fatalismo teologico e sulle questioni che vi sono implicate, come la conoscenza dei futuri contingenti e il compatibilismo tra prescienza divina e libero arbitrio. Raccogliendo e ripensando fonti di diversa provenienza, Roberto Grossatesta e Pietro Lombardo in primis, il Venerabilis inceptor sposta il problema sul piano epistemologico e (...) linguistico, affrontandolo dal punto di vista di un’analisi proposizionale degli enunciati che parlano dei contingenti futuri. In questo modo egli affida agli strumenti dell’argomentazione logica e dell’indagine semantica il compito di sciogliere le implicazioni teologiche della questione, in una teoria che garantisca al contempo la prescienza di Dio e la libera volontà umana. Il principio della soluzione ockhamiana, che costituirà un punto di riferimento – pro o contro – nei dibattiti teologici del XIV secolo, consiste nell’intreccio tra analisi proposizionale e logica fidei, in nome di una soluzione pragmatica del dilemma compatibilista: come mostra il caso esemplare della profezia, gli enunciati della scienza divina costituiscono i postulati di una logica della credenza che poi procede da quelle premesse, attraverso una catena argomentativa, a formulare i precetti che guideranno i passi del cristiano nel mondo. Il volume rende disponibile per la prima volta al lettore non soltanto la prima traduzione in italiano del Tractatus, ma anche un ricco apparato di testi (le distinctiones 38, 39 e 40 dell’Ordinatio, i capitoli 7 e 27 della Summa Logicae, la quaestio IV.4 dei Quodlibeta, le Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum 41 e 44, il prologo della Expositio in libros Physicorum e un estratto dalla Expositio in Librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis) che consente di ricostruire in modo coerente una teoria ockhamiana della contingenza e di gettare luce su una nuova interpretazione del pensiero del teologo e filosofo inglese. (shrink)

In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent (organisms and bodies can vary, as can even the spaces they occupy in the same experience vary), 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- (...) phenomenal externalism of enactivist nature, even in its mild form, is empirically implausible: the correlation between the conscious character of sensory experience with spatiotemporal neuronal patterns is much more systematic and regular than with anything outside the brain. But in its radical form is entirely implausible and contra-intuitive: phenomenal duplicates are not necessarily duplicates of agency; in short, 5-we are our own brain that has a body, avatars, and artifacts, properly configured, and molded by the brain, and not a body that has a brain among other essential organs. (shrink)